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EVIDENCE:

OKLAHOMA'S HosPITAL BEcor s EXCEPTION
An important aspect of personal injury litigation is the introduction of hospital records into evidence. The relative importance of
hospital records in the trial of a personal injury case is not reflected
by the number of cases in Oklahoma which have questioned their
admissibility. These records are quite susceptible to attack as being
hearsay evidence, because the person who actually made the entries
is rarely called upon to testify to the truth of the facts stated therein. Therefore, many jurisdictions have developed an exception allowing these records into evidence, or will admit them as books of
account, public records, or as part of the res gestae.1
The first Oklahoma case questioning the admissibility of hospital records was Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradbury.2 In this
case the court held that a "clinic card" should have been excluded
by the trial court as heresay evidence. The court did not state
any reasons for the exclusion other than that they considered the
card to be hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. A definitive test to
determine the admissibility of hospital records was stated by the
court four years later, in Hembree v. Von Keller, when the court,
in excluding the hospital chart of a patient, stated:
"In order for book accounts of a hospital and the charts of
patients therein to be admissible in evidence, they must be
shown to have been correctly kept, to have been kept in the
ordinary course of business as an essential part of the system
of business, to have been made at or reasonably near the time
of the transaction, to be books of original entries, and shown
to be relevant and material to the issue."3
The4 court cited as authority for this test, Sharp v. Pawhuska Ice
Co., which did not concern hospital records, but merely books of
account. Even though the Sharp court arrived at a test for the admission of books of account by summarizing past decisions, this
test was dictum because the court stated that the admission into
evidence of books of account was not a question before the court.
Although dictum, and concerned only with books of account, the
test was utilized in the Hembree case to determine the admissibility
of hospital records.
IBrown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954),

Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 553 (1955); See 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 728 (1942).
2179 Okla. 253, 65 P.2d 433 (1937).
3 189 Okla. 439-440, 119 P.2d 433 (1937).

49 Okla. 211, 217 Pac. 214 (1923).

5Id. at 215, 217 Pac. at 217, citing Whitcomb v. Oiler, 41 Olda. 331,
137 Pac. 709 (1913); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. O'Neil, 36 Okla. 792, 130
Pac. 270 (1913); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Walker, 27 Okla. 849, 113 Pac.
907 (1911); First Natl Bank v. Yeoman, 14 Okla. 626 78 Pac. 388 (1904);

Navarre v. Honea, 41 Okla. 480, 139 Pac. 310 (19141.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In City of Altus v. Martin,6 the defendant attacked the test
utilized by the court in the Sharp and Hembree cases as being
mere dictum and, therefore, not binding upon the court. This argument was brushed aside, the court contending that while the test
might be dictum, it was still part of the body of law of Oklahoma,
had not been over-ruled, and was applicable to the hospital records in question.
In arriving at the test to be used in determining the admissibility of hospital records, the court has created an interesting dichotomy: although treating hospital records as if they were books
of account, the court has ignored the statutory provision which
provides tests for determining the admissibility of books of account. The Oklahoma Statute provides:
"Entries in books of account may be admitted in evidence,
when it is made to appear by the oath of the person who made
the entries, that such entries are correct, and were made at or
near the time of the transaction to which they relate, or upon
proof of the handwriting of the person who made the entries,
in case of his death or absence from the county, or upon proof
that the same were made in the usual course of business.' -,
19641

It can be observed that the test, as applied in the Hembree
and Altus cases, and the statutory provisions, have many similarities; but the importance in comparing the two comes not from the
similarities, but from their dissimilarities. Arguably, since the statute
is stated in the disjunctive, it makes three tests applicable in differing situations; the first test requires the oath of the person who
made the entries, the second is applicable where the person who
made the entries is dead or absent, and the third makes entries
admissible upon a showing that they were made in the usual course8
of business. In Hemisphere Oil & Gas Co. v. Oil Well Supply Co.,
the court interpreted the statute, and declared that the phrase
"made in the usual course of business," furnished "another way" to
test the admissibility of books of account. Therefore, by its own
rulings the court has declared that the provisions of the statute are
severable, and furnish not one, but three tests. 9
The court in the Hembree case does not cite the statutory
provisions, however, it does use some language of the statute. The
Hembree court applied the statutes language conjunctively instead
of disjunctively, and thereby made one test out of two statutory
tests. Instead of utilizing the "ors" of the statute, the Hembree test
applies the statutory language as if it were separated by "and's."
The Hembree court takes the first test of the statute, which re6268 P.2d 228 (Okla. 1954).
7 12 OxLA. STAT. § 501 (1961).

8 104 Okla. 83, 230 Pac. 245 (1924).
9 See, State ex rel Shull v. Banta, 148 Okla. 239, 247, 299 Pac. 479, 487
(1931).
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quires that the records must be shown to have been correctly kept;
adds the third statutory test, "made in the usual course of business,"
to make one test, and then proceeds to add "as an essential part
of the system of business . . . to be books of original entries and
shown to be relevant and material to the issue." 0
The result is that under the Hembree test, the litigant offering
the records must show much more than he is required to under the
statutory enactments as interpreted by the Hemisphere Oil & Gas
case. Under the statutes third test, the litigant need only show that
the records were made in the "usual course of business," but by
virtue of the present rulings in Oklahoma his burden would just be
beginning. He must further show that the records were made at or
near the time of the transaction to which they relate, that they are
an essential part of the system of doing business, that they are
books of original entry, and relevant and material to the issue.
It has been argued by writers in the field," that hospital records should be admitted, either on identification of the original by
the keeper of the records, or by an offer of a certified or sworn copy.
The argument is made that the purpose of the hospital records exception is to prevent a disruption of the staff of a hospital. The
charts of even a single patient are compiled by a number of physicians, interns, nurses, and technicians and these charts should be
admitted without calling these people to testify which would interfere with the routine of the hospital. This is clearly a rule of necessity. It is also felt that since hospital records are relied upon in
affairs of life and death and are, therefore, meticulously kept, they
contain a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness; and the
occasional ommissions and errors occurring in the routine work are
no more an obstacle to the general trustworthiness of the records
than are the errors of witnesses on the stand.
These scholars also note that because hospitals handle large
numbers of patients in their day-to-day operations, the person who
made the entries could recall from actual memory few or none of
the specific events recorded. To call these people to the stand would
ordinarily add little or nothing to the information furnished by the
records alone. Therefore, the writers feel that an offer by the keeper
of the records would satisfy protective evidentiary rules, facilitate
trial, and relieve hospital staffs of an unnecessary burden.
The legislature of Oklahoma has demonstrated a willingness
to trust the veracity of hospital records in habeas corpus proceedings for the release of the mentally 111.12 No requirements are imposed upon the admission of these records and they are no different
than any other hospital records. Could it not be argued that be10 189 Okla. at 440, 119 P.2d at 76 (syl 4). Compare this language with
STAT. § 501 (1961).
116 WiGMORE, EViDENcE § 1707 (3d ed. 1940); McConMXcE, EViENCE

12 OxLA.

§ 290 (1954).

1243A OKA. STAT. § 99 (1961).
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